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Title: A tale of two harts: the paradox in essays on Bentham
Authors: Swaminathan, Shivprasad
Keywords: Bentham
Cognitivist metaethic
Projectivist mode
Issue Date: 31-Mar-2017
Publisher: Cambridge University Press, New York
Citation: Swaminathan, Shivprasad. (2017). A tale of two harts: the paradox in essays on Bentham. Legal Theory, Vol 23 No 1: 27–54
Abstract: This paper hypothesizes that the paradox Hart confesses to in Ch. X of Essays on Bentham was the result of metaethical ambivalence. Hart eclectically yokes together metaethically incompatible elements from two disparate models of “normativity of law” with different sources of normativity: the impinging model based on a cognitivist metaethic and the projectivist model based on a noncognitivist metaethic. The “sources” of normativity in the two models are different. On the impinging model the source of normativity is a reason-giving objective moral requirement, and on the projectivist model, the source of normativity is a motivationally affective conative attitude. The metaethical configuration of the rule of recognition in Essays on Bentham constrained Hart to postulate a “source” of normativity metaethically congruous with the impinging model. However, the “source” of normativity Hart seemed keen to advance—he makes an “attitude” the source of normativity—was only congruous with the projectivist model.
ISSN: 1352-3252
Appears in Collections:JGU Research Publications

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