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dc.contributor.authorSwaminathan, Shivprasad-
dc.identifier.citationSwaminathan, Shivprasad (2015). Projectivism and the meta-ethical foundations of the normativity of law. Jurisprudence, Vol 7. No 2: 231-266en_US
dc.identifier.issn2040-3313 (Print)-
dc.identifier.issn2040-3321 (Online)-
dc.descriptionScopus Index-
dc.description.abstractA successful account of the ‘normativity of law’ is meant to inter alia establish how legal requirements come to be morally binding. This question presupposes taking a stance on the metaethical debate about the nature of morality and moral bindingness between the cognitivist and non-cognitivist camps. An overwhelming majority of contemporary legal philosophers have an unspoken adherence to a cognitivist metaethic and the model of normativity of law emerging from it: the impinging model. Consequently, the problematic of the normativity of law is so calibrated as to in limine rule out any putative account of the normativity of law that presupposes a non-cognitivist metaethic: the projectivist model. This paper calls for a recalibration of the problematic of the normativity of law to a metaethically aseptic viewpoint from which the projectivist model is seen as a plausible theoretical contender to the impinging model. It also sets out the philosophical underpinnings of the rojectivist model and contrasts it from the impinging model.en_US
dc.publisherTaylor & Francisen_US
dc.subjectNormativity of Lawen_US
dc.subjectMoral Bindingnessen_US
dc.titleProjectivism and the metaethical foundations of the normativity of lawen_US
dc.institutionJindal Global Law Schoolen_US
Appears in Collections:JGU Research Publications

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