Development Space In India’s Trade And Investment Agreements: A Fresh Look

By

James J. Nedumpara

ABSTRACT

The paper examines India’s experience in regulating trade and investment, especially since the initiation of trade and economic reforms in 1991. Political opposition in India to assuming obligations under international treaties resulted in the adoption of various policy flexibilities in areas such as public health and access to drugs, local content measures, environmental standards, trade remedies and such other topics under the WTO. In recent times, India has signed comprehensive economic partnership agreements with developed economies such as Japan, South Korea and Singapore and is negotiating a trade and investment agreement with the European Union (EU).

The paper provides an analysis of the focus and coverage of issues under these trade and investment agreements and areas where India has negotiated development space or policy autonomy. In addition, the paper discusses the recent claims made against India under various Bilateral Investment Promotion Agreements (BIPA) and the safeguards adopted by India while negotiating such new agreements, or renegotiating, or reviewing existing agreements. Based on this approach this paper seeks to contribute to the project that attempts to compare and contrast the multiple strategies adopted by Southern countries in regulating trade and investment.

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I. INTRODUCTION

There is an eternal scepticism within India on the merits of actively participating in the multilateral or regional trade and investment treaties. Although India is a founding member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), it is considered a reluctant liberaliser and an ‘inflexible’ negotiator in trade negotiations. To an extent, this scepticism is a legacy of India’s socialist, import substitution based model of development. For a country which laid its economic foundation on the Nehruvian model of mixed economy and central planning, convincing the domestic constituents of the merits of liberalisation of trade and investment can often be difficult. In addition, losing some key disputes in the WTO in the late 1990s had significant political and economic consequences. For India, losing the India – Patent (Mail box) case at the WTO

+ Associate Professor, Jindal Global Law School, Sonipat, India. I am grateful to Vandana Gyanchandani and Rishab Raturi for research assistance. A slightly different version of this paper was presented at the 5th Society of International Law (SIEL) Conference at Berne, Switzerland in July, 2014. All errors remain mine.


513 Appellate Body Report, India- Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals and Agricultural Chemical Products,
in 1999 and the compulsion to phase out the quantitative restrictions\textsuperscript{514} pursuant to its loss before a WTO panel and Appellate Body was politically challenging. In the context of these losses, justifying the benefits of undertaking additional obligations was politically untenable for India. At the same time, its perennial balance of payment crisis, which heightened during 1990-91, left India with very little choice except to pursue economic liberalisation.

The scepticism has its own advantages. This scepticism and domestic backlash against assuming international obligations on sensitive matters such as goods, services and agriculture enabled India to play a crucial, and often pivotal, role in trade negotiations, especially in multilateral trade negotiations. By the late 1990s India had established domestic consultation mechanisms and had built up strong stakeholder capacity that helped India participate in such negotiations in a more informed and meaningful way. India’s understanding of the GATT dynamics and the multilateral trading system also equipped it to adopt well-thought out, calibrated positions, especially in the Doha Round among other free trade agreement negotiations.\textsuperscript{515}

While there is overwhelming literature on India’s strategies and approaches to pushing for equitable and development-friendly legal ordering in multilateral trade negotiations, especially in WTO negotiations, very little attention has been paid to India’s approach in negotiating bilateral investment treaties or other free trade agreements with investment chapters. This was not a very significant issue for India until very recently. However, a slew of challenges, or potential challenges against India under the bilateral investment treaties (BITs) has rekindled the debate on whether India has carved out sufficient policy space in the existing investment treaties and, more importantly, in the proposed negotiations. Especially after the cancellation of telecom licenses by the Supreme Court of India in February 2012 the Indian government has received a series of notices of


dispute from a number of global telecom majors which had investments in India. (See Annex I).

In this paper, I examine India’s developmental thrust in trade and investment treaty negotiations and some of the areas where India had eloquently persuaded the multilateral trading community of the equity and desirability of leaving sufficient policy space. After tracing this history, the paper examines availability of policy space in India’s bilateral investment agreements. The paper also examines the reasons that might have prompted India to review its negotiating positions, especially in bilateral investment treaties, and recommends a few policy flexibilities that India should insist upon in its current and future negotiations.

II. India and the Debate on Development Space in Trade and Investment Agreements

There is a significant body of literature on the role of neo-liberal institutions such as the WTO in developing countries.516 Liberal scholars consider the WTO and other preferential trade and investment agreements as a mechanism for these countries to achieve prosperity and economic welfare. Development scholars, on the other hand, contest the claims of liberal trade scholars and argue that multilateral trade institutions such as the WTO could cripple the regulatory autonomy of sovereign states and impose undesirable restrictions on them. India, for long, pursued a cautionary approach to stay clear of the traps of an “asymmetric system” of which it had significant misgivings. Although India had initiated economic liberalization in the early 1990s, liberalization remained constrained in scope.517 India’s experience with the operation and implementation of the WTO Agreements, in a way, reaffirmed some of India’s concerns. India was at the vanguard of negotiating

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517 Martin Wolf, India in the World, India’s Economy: Performance and Challenges, 369, 389 (Shankar Acharya & Rakes Mohan eds., 2010).
flexibilities within the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement).\textsuperscript{518} Especially in the context of TRIPS, India used important flexibilities such as the limits on patentable subject matter,\textsuperscript{519} expansive procedural opportunities to challenge patents and restrictions on injunctive reliefs.\textsuperscript{520} In fact, some scholars are of the opinion that India’s set of exclusions to patentability is almost unknown everywhere else in the world.\textsuperscript{521} Further, India also adopted an exceptionally high threshold for inventive step (non-obviousness) and mechanism for implementing mechanisms such as compulsory licensing. TRIPS and pharmaceutical product patents brought politicians, parliamentarians, NGOs and think tanks in for a transnational discourse on pharmaceutical patent law—a discourse which was hitherto unknown in India.

Coming closely on the heels of the \textit{Patent-Mail Box} case was another dispute concerning the implementation of quantitative restrictions on a wide category of agricultural and consumer items. The dispute settlement ruling in \textit{India-QR} reignited the debate on trade agreements and policy space in India. Notwithstanding the 1991 economic liberalization, India continued to maintain import licensing and quantitative restrictions on products which constituted nearly 30 percent of the tariff lines. The import restrictions were maintained on balance of payment grounds, but provided protection to products generally manufactured by the small scale industries (SSI) in India. Although a number of countries had maintained quantitative restrictions on balance of payment grounds during the GATT period (1947-1995), as a matter of practice, such restrictions were hardly challenged before the dispute settlement panels. India defended the restrictions on the ground that pre-existing GATT practice under Article XXIII precluded Member countries from approaching dispute


\textsuperscript{519} The most important exclusion is Section 3(d) of the Patent Act which forbids patents on both new uses of known substances that do not enhance “efficacy”.


\textsuperscript{521} \textit{Id.}, at 1574 (noting that “India has mapped out an extraordinary array of TRIPS flexibilities, some of which are unknown elsewhere in the world”).
settlement panels on claims relating to balance of payment provisions under the GATT. The panel as well as the Appellate Body maintained that the quantitative restrictions amounted to a violation of Article XI: I of the GATT and that they cannot be justified under Article XVIII:B of GATT, 1994. The Appellate Body stated that clear WTO rules could not be disregarded in order to safeguard institutional balance between political and quasi-judicial organs of the WTO.522 This case also brought a marked change in the substantive approach to balance-of-payment issues, which some commentators have interpreted as a movement away from the pragmatism of the GATT towards a more adjudicatory, “legalistic” approach.523

When India negotiated multilateral or other regional trade agreements, it exercised extraordinary due diligence and broad-based stakeholder consultations. For example, at the time of the Uruguay Round negotiations, the Indian Parliament appointed the I K Gujral Committee524 to solicit views and prepare a report on the Dunkel Draft and to assess impact of the WTO Agreement on India.525 Several other Parliamentary Committees including the Arjun Singh Committee were established to advise the government during the negotiating phase (1987-1994).

The lessons learnt from these disputes prepared India to formulate clear negotiating positions in the Doha Round trade negotiations and a host of other preferential trade agreements. India also established domestic mechanisms and systems including vibrant investigating agencies for administering antidumping and safeguarding duties. One could argue that India had an effective mechanism in identifying and preserving policy space especially in multilateral trade agreements.

522 Frieder Roessler, The Institutional Balance between the Judicial and the Political Organs of the WTO, NEW DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 325, 325-46 (Marco Bronckers & Reinhard Quic eds., 2000).
524 I K Gujral was the Prime Minister of India during 1997-98.
III. India and International investment Agreements

Traditionally, India is a strong believer in the multilateral trading system and has shown an inclination for preferential trade agreements only in recent times. India has a long history of participation in the multilateral trading system, being a founding member of both the GATT and the WTO. Of late, India has also been actively pursuing various regional trade agreements. (See Annex II). Some of the RTAs have been negotiated as part of the ‘Look East’ strategy. However, one could say that multilateralism is always the preferred route for international economic cooperation for India.

After India initiated its major economic reforms in 1991, successive governments introduced a series of measures to encourage foreign direct investment (FDI).526 India’s FDI flows before initiation of the economic reforms i.e. in 1991 were $300 mn. In contrast, FDI inflows into India in 2013 alone amounted close to $28 bn. (See Chart below). At present, FDI is permitted in most sectors with certain exceptions and subject to certain caps and conditions. In sync with its neo-liberal economic policies, the government considered the Bilateral Investment Promotion Agreements (BIPA) or Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs)527 as an effective mechanism to boost investor confidence. India has signed BITs with a number of capital exporting countries including United Kingdom, Germany and Netherlands. As of 2013, India has signed 86 Bilateral Investment Promotion Agreements of which 72 are in force.528 A vast majority of India’s BITs have been signed during the period 1996-2003. In addition to the BITs, India has also signed four economic cooperation agreements with South Korea (2009), Singapore (2005), Japan (2011) and Malaysia (2011). These economic cooperation treaties are generally preferential trade agreements with investment protection clauses.529

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527 Please note that BIPA and BITs are used interchangeably in this paper.
529 Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (BIPAs): List of counties with whom IPA has
a. BITs and Policy flexibility

It remains unclear whether Indian negotiators had seriously considered the potential conflict between international investment regimes and the regulatory state during their negotiating phase.\(^{530}\) It appears that the BIPA/BITs negotiations were generally undertaken without sufficient deliberation or preparedness. In a way they were quietly done.\(^{531}\) Several scholars and stakeholders have commented that there was negligible stakeholder participation in the signing of BITs. This happened even after India had major disputes with several U.S. investors in connection with the Dabhol power project.\(^{532}\)

\(^{530}\) See Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF) 97/1, Award (Aug. 30, 2000) (dealing with a refusal to issue a waste disposal permit); S. D. Myers Inc. v. Canada, Merits, 8 ICSID Report 4 (Nov. 13, 2000) (concerning a ban on hazardous waste exports); Ethyl Corp. v Canada, Jurisdiction Award (June 24, 1998), 38 ILM 708 (1999) (concerning a proposed ban on ethyl as a carcinogenic substance).


\(^{532}\) Enron, a U.S. based energy trading company, had invested US $3 billion in a 10-year Liquefied Natural Gas Power Plant Development Project in India. This was the largest development project in India, and also the single largest direct foreign investment in India's history at the time of investment (1991). Work on the Dabhol Power Plant ('Dabhol') near Mumbai, Maharashtra began in 1992, and the plant was scheduled to have become operational by 1997. Dabhol was supposed to supply India with more than 2000 megawatts of electricity. But endless disputes over prices and terms of the deal resulted in the eventual collapse of the venture.
failed Dabhol power project, although India did not have any BIPA/BIT with the United States, several U.S. investors sought arbitration under the India-Mauritius BIPA. In the Dabhol matter, the foreign investors were compensated and the matter was settled.

In the above context, India adopted a Model BIT in 2003 which was by and large based on the OECD model text of 1991. The Model BIT served as a template for its BITs negotiations, especially for the fresh BIPAs/BITs. However, the model BIT was based on the template developed by capital exporting countries. The OECD in its Investment Policy Review notes that Indian BIPAs/BITs generally offered strong guarantees in the post establishment phase on fair and equitable treatment, national treatment, expropriation and free transfers as well as direct access to international arbitration. Some commentators even opine that India was “over enthusiastic” in signing these treaties and the consequences of any fallout from such treaties were not properly studied or explored by the government. However, treaty provisions of the BIPA/BITs were hardly invoked by any foreign investor until very recently.

IV. White Industries and the Renewed Debate on Policy Space

Nothing explains India’s shock and dismay at the consequences of an investment arbitration award better than the White Industries case. In 2010, White Industries, an Australian company approached an ad hoc Tribunal established under the UNCITRAL Rules under the India-Australia BIT. The Arbitral Tribunal rendered an award holding that India’s ‘inordinate delay’ in enforcing an arbitral award violated the “effective means” standard incorporated by the Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) clause of the India-Australia BIT. White Industries, the Australian investor, had obtained an award for over Australian $4 mn in 2002 against Coal India Limited (CIL) in connection with the supply of equipment and

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535 Id.
536 See Annexure I for details.
537 White Industries Australia Limited v. The Republic of India, UNCITRAL, Final Award (30 November, 2011) ¶ 11.4.19. [Hereinafter “White Industries Arbitration Award”].
development of a coal mine. The matter resulted in a protracted litigation for enforcement and White Industries commenced arbitration proceedings in 2010. White Industries contended that the delay violated the provisions on fair and equitable treatment (FET), expropriation, MFN treatment, free transfer of funds and several other provisions of the India-Australia BIT. The tribunal dismissed White Industries' allegations related to violation of FET, expropriation and free transfer of funds. Even on the claim of "denial of justice", the tribunal ruled in India’s favour. The tribunal, however, found India guilty of violating the India-Australia BIT because the Indian judicial system was unable to deal with White Industries’ jurisdictional claim in over nine years. The tribunal held that the delay by Indian courts violated India’s obligation to provide White Industries with an “effective means of asserting claims and enforcing rights.” This is despite the fact that the India-Australia BIT does not mention or include such a duty for host states. The Tribunal allowed White Industries to base their claim by importing the “effective means” provision from the India-Kuwait BIPA.

The outcome in White Industries brought into the center-stage the importance of policy space in trade and investment treaty negotiations. India’s preparedness in investment treaty negotiations was noticeably inadequate when compared to its preparedness in trade negotiations. In the WTO negotiations as well as in RTA negotiations, India had carefully negotiated sufficient “wiggle room” or policy flexibility. In addition to TRIPS, which I have already explained in this paper, India negotiated hard for policy autonomy in areas such as subsidy disciplines in Agreement on Agriculture, reduction of duties under Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA), Rules negotiations,\(^{538}\) exclusion of Singapore issues\(^{539}\) from the

\(^{538}\) Negotiations in the area of antidumping, subsidies and countervailing measures and safeguards are collectively referred to as “Rules negotiations”.

\(^{539}\) The “Singapore issues” refers to four working groups set up during the World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference of 1996 in Singapore. These groups are tasked with these issues: transparency in government procurement, trade facilitation (customs issues), trade and investment, and trade and competition.
coverage of Doha negotiations etc. However, it is noticed that in the area of Bilateral Investment Treaties, the government did not explore the type of flexibilities which it had examined for trade negotiations. As Mihaela Papa notes, the emerging economies were not as organized and willing in the realm of international investment treaty negotiations and dispute settlement as they were in the realm of WTO and international trade. While renegotiation of these BITs may not be immediately feasible or practicable, the paper examines the different areas where the existing BIPAs/BITs lack flexibility and how India should adopt a BIT/BIPA which could cater to India’s development aspirations.

Sovereign states would always like to preserve their right to regulate. This objective can be attained only if arbitrators give deference to the actions of the state agencies. Therefore, the investment treaty language deserves special attention. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention of the Law Treaties (VCLT) unambiguously states that, “[a] Treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”. Deference to the language of the BIT could alleviate the concerns of developing countries which are negotiating new agreements. Furthermore, as argued elsewhere, ‘vague, broad, inconsistent, and inadequately drafted provisions will defeat the interests of India particularly in the domain of regulatory domain”.

The following section identifies certain areas where India should consider the availability of development space while it is engaged in formulating a new BIPA model.

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a. **Tightening the Scope and Content of ‘Investment’**

The scope and definition of investment is a threshold issue which triggers the applicability of the investment treaty and the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal.

The 2003 Model BIPA adopted by India has included a broad asset-based definition of investment. All of India’s BIPAs, except the India-Mexico BIPA, follow this broad asset-based definition of investment.545 Such a definition would include every kind of asset including direct investment, portfolio investment, intellectual property rights, rights to money, business concessions conferred under law or contract etc.546

The definition of “investment” was an issue in the *White Industries* arbitration as well. India argued during the arbitral proceedings that the mining contract between White Industries and Coal India Limited was an “ordinary commercial contract for the supply of goods and services” and that it did not constitute an investment. But according to the tribunal the contract rights fell with the terms “right[s] to money or to any performance having a financial value”. The tribunal further noted that White Industries’ commitment under the Mining Contract “extended far beyond the provision of equipment and technical services” since it provided its own working capital, equipment and technical know-how and assumed financial risks for cost escalation and other penalties for inadequate performance.547

India’s experience in White Industries clearly demonstrates that an open-ended definition of the term “investment” could bring a range of activities within the meaning of investment. There have been proposals to include an “enterprise based definition of investment” in the BITs. According to this approach, investment is limited to direct investments or investments made through a locally established enterprise. Such a definition could ensure that only “real and substantial business operations” within the territory of the host state could qualify as

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546 *Id.*

547 White Industries Arbitration Award, *supra* note 25, para. 7.4.10.
investment and consequently avail the benefits available under the BIPAs/BITs.

b. Delineating the Contours of ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’

Fair and equitable treatment (FET) is a widely invoked principle in international investment arbitration. In practice, it has been noticed that this principle has been given an extremely wide interpretation to include concepts such as stability, transparency, legitimate expectations, compliance with contractual obligations, procedural fairness, acting in good faith, etc. For example, in TECMED S.A v. Mexico, the Tribunal held that the FET obligation requires a host state to extend to foreign investors the legitimate expectations which the investor had at the time of making the investments. As many as 71 out of 73 of India’s currently active BIPAs incorporate the FET principle. Again, a vast majority of these BIPAs do not define the substantive content of the FET or provide any additional guidance regarding its meaning. This provides room for an expansive interpretation of India’s BIT provisions.

As the content of the FET standard is largely uncertain, a claim of violation of FET serves as a “catch-all” claim in practically every treaty based arbitration claim. As the Tribunal in Gami v. Mexico noted, “the standard [of FET] is to some extent a flexible one which must be applied to the circumstances of each case”. A flexible interpretation of FET could result in incorporation of normative concepts developed in arbitral practice. In practice, a flexible interpretation of FET has often prejudicially affected the interests of the host state.

A perusal of India’s BITs indicates that only a few BITs have linked the concept of FET with the concept of ‘minimum standard of treatment of aliens’ (MST) under customary international law. A notable example is the investment provision under India-Korea

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548 Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A (TECMED) v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case no. ARB/A/00/2, ¶ 154 (May 29, 2003).
549 Prabhash Ranjan, India and Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 34.
552 See, Waste Management Inc. v. Mexico, ICSID Case no. ARB(AF)/00/3, para. 98 (April 30, 2004).
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Treaty (CEPA). It states that the FET does not require treatment in addition to or beyond what is required by the MST of aliens in customary international law. There is an overwhelming view that linking FET to MST under customary international law could provide greater regulatory autonomy to the host state. The MST principle under customary international law is purportedly based on the *Neer standard* which contemplates that conduct amounts “to an outrage, to bad faith, to wilful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of governmental action so far short of international standards that any reasonable or impartial man would readily recognize its inefficiency.”

In *Glamis Gold v. United States*, a NAFTA Tribunal has held that the *Neer Standard* was still the relevant standard to determine whether a country has violated the MST under customary international law. Linking FET with MST of aliens under customary international law is expected to raise the threshold for claims based on FET.

There are different approaches to limiting the scope of FET. One approach would be to expressly exclude the reference to FET. For example, the India-Singapore CECA has omitted any reference to “FET” or even “MST”. Another approach would be to clarify that the FET standard is subsumed within and not autonomous of the MST. A third safeguard would be to segregate the core elements of FET such as “denial of justice”, “due process” etc., and incorporate these terms in the BIPAs/BITs with appropriate qualifications. For example, prefixing qualifying terms such as “flagrant violation of natural justice”, “egregious violation of due process”, “gross unfairness” etc. could ensure a standard that is more deferential towards the host government. An appropriate qualifying term could eliminate the possibility of arbitral discretion and enhance the threshold benchmarks. This could also be a suitable safeguard against autonomous interpretation of fair and equitable treatment.

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556 See Art. VI (1), Bilateral Investment Treaty, Spain- Mexico, done on Oct 10, 2006.
c. Defining the Limits of 'Expropriation'

Broadly, the concept of expropriation involves governmental taking of property for which compensation is required to be paid. Although various Arbitral Tribunals have defined the term “expropriation” in myriad ways, it is widely considered to include both direct and indirect expropriation. Direct expropriation involves an outright transfer of title. However, cases of such direct expropriations have become relatively uncommon. At the same time, a web of administrative machinery and regulatory policing has led to frequent incidents of indirect expropriations. All of the 73 BITs signed by India contain some provisions on expropriation. A number of India’s BITs expressly state that an investment shall not be nationalized or expropriated (direct expropriation) or subjected to measures having ‘effect’ equivalent to expropriation (indirect expropriation) unless or until there is a public purpose, and that in such cases fair and equitable compensation shall be promptly paid to foreign investors.557

There is a broad feeling that most of the BITs signed by India are drafted in an extremely open-ended manner. A bulk of the BITs do not provide much indication to arbitrators on how to identify indirect expropriation barring the focus on the effect on investment.558 These BITs could be risky for India because a large number of regulatory measures could be challenged as expropriation as long as they have an effect on investment.559 According to a study conducted by Prabhash Ranjan, only 16 out of 73 BITs signed by India provide additional indicators that an arbitral tribunal may need to take into account while determining claims of indirect expropriation.560 Additional indicators include factors such as the character of the measure and the objective of the regulatory policy. On the positive side, however, these 16 BITs provide that any non-discriminatory measures designed to protect legitimate public welfare objectives do not constitute expropriation except in rare

557 Prabhash Ranjan, India and Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 31.
558 Id.
559 Id.
560 Id.
circumstances. These types of carve-outs—in the nature of Methanex562 type carve outs—could be particularly helpful for developing countries such as India.

The discussion on expropriation will have special significance in the context of grant of compulsory licenses on pharmaceutical products. In the context of the TRIPS Agreement, specifically, India has long maintained that compulsory licensing was one of the flexibilities available to developing countries to meet public health emergencies. Only four of the BITs (Japan, Malaysia, Singapore and Korea) specifically exempt issuance of compulsory licences concerning intellectual property from the purview of expropriation.563 For example, the recent grant of compulsory license to an Indian firm NATCO to manufacture Nexavar, an anti-cancer drug has created significant controversy.564 The patent is owned in this case by a German firm, Bayer AG. The compulsory license was granted after the Indian Patent Office ruled that Bayer AG was selling the drug at an excessively high price. According to the terms of the compulsory license, NATCO agreed to supply the drug at Rs. 8,800 per month and to give the drug free of cost to at least 600 patients every year. It is often argued that exclusivity is a central feature to any intellectual property and that grant of compulsory license significantly devalues that asset and, therefore, has an effect equivalent to expropriation under international law. However, nothing in India’s BITs prevents Bayer from invoking investment treaty arbitration against India on the same.

Another major controversy was the amendment to the Indian Income Tax Act with retrospective effect from 1962 (which is the date of original enactment of the Income Tax Act) to assert the Central government’s right to levy capital gains tax on share purchases involving overseas companies with business assets in India. The amendment was apparently

561 Id.
562 Methanex Corp v. United States, Final Award 44 ILM 1345, Aug. 3, 2005 (noting that a “non-discriminatory regulation for public purposes, which is enacted in accordance with due process” is not expropriation).
563 Id.
to overcome a decision of the Supreme Court of India which ruled in favour of Vodafone, a UK listed telecom group, regarding its liability to withhold taxes on its indirect acquisition of Hutchinson Essar, an Indian mobile operator, in 2007.\footnote{Vodafone International Holdings B.V. v. Union of India & Anr., Civil Appeal No. 733 of 2012.26529 of 2010.} Indian tax authorities had imposed tax on Vodafone for failing to deduct tax on its $11 billion payment to Hutchinson. In April, 2012, Vodafone served notice of dispute against the Indian government alleging that the retrospective amendments would amount to violation of international legal protection.\footnote{See Raag Yadava et al, Vodafone and India: A Review of Claims in Investment Arbitration (National Law School of India University Working Paper Series, 2012), https://www.nls.ac.in/resources/report.pdf.}

At a time when some of the legal notices could lead to full-fledged investment treaty arbitration proceedings, it will be instructive to examine how India could minimize the impact of these adverse claims. It will be impossible to exclude a language on direct and indirect expropriation from any of India’s BITs. However, it is possible to expressly mention that “only a permanent and complete, or near complete, deprivation of property” could amount to expropriation. In certain cases such as Occidental v. Ecuador,\footnote{Occidental Exploration and Production Co. v. Republic of Ecuador (Award) LCIA Case No. UN 3467 (UNCITRAL, 2004).} it was sufficient for the governmental measure to “affect the economic value of an investment” to constitute expropriation. It will be prudent on the part of India to adopt a test which could take care of sovereign functions such as taxation from being litigated before arbitral tribunals.

d. Leaving Out ‘MFN Provisions’

The Most-Favoured- Nation (MFN) principle has been used to import both substantive and procedural provisions into BITs. There have been incidents in the past where MFN clauses have been used to extend liability standards\footnote{Asian Agricultural Products Ltd v. Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3.} as well as bypass procedural preconditions for arbitration.\footnote{Emilio Augustin Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7.} The significance of the MFN provisions came up for significant scrutiny after the Tribunal’s finding in the White Industries case. The argument in White Industries was that the failure of the Indian courts to deal with White Industries’
jurisdictional claim for over nine years amounted to a breach of India’s obligation to provide the foreign investor an “effective means of asserting claims and enforcing rights.” Such an “effective means” clause was not present in the India-Australia BIT. The tribunal stated that White Industries could rely upon the ‘effective means’ provision present in the India-Kuwait BIPA on the basis of the MFN provision of the India-Australia BIT.\(^{570}\) The Indian government contended that relying upon the “effective means” provision in the India-Kuwait treaty would "fundamentally subvert the carefully negotiated balance of the BIT".\(^{571}\) However, this plea was overruled by the tribunal stating that borrowing beneficial substantive provisions from a third-party treaty would help achieve the result intended by the incorporation of the MFN provision.

Barring two BITs, India has included the MFN principle in most of its investment treaties. This principle is broadly worded with limited exceptions.\(^{572}\) These exceptions have narrow application and are meant for taxation or other obligations in connection with free trade agreements or exclusive custom zones or areas.\(^{573}\) Broad and unqualified MFN provisions in Indian BITs opens up the possibility of foreign investors borrowing beneficial treaty provisions from India’s other BITs, as was the case in *White Industries*.\(^{574}\)

In the BITs/BIPAs that India has formalized thus far, a very broad application of MFN provisions is very common.\(^{575}\) For example, the MFN provisions of the BIPA with France accords “to investments of investors of other Contracting Party, including their operation, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal by such investors, treatment which shall not be less favourable than that accorded to investments of its investors, or than the

\(^{570}\) *White Industries Arbitration Award*, *supra* note 25.

\(^{571}\) *Id.* ¶ 11.2.1.

\(^{572}\) *Id.*

\(^{573}\) *See* e.g., India-Switzerland BIT provide exception to MFN obligation under Article 4(2) and (3) while according special advantages by virtue of FTA, Customs Union or a Common Market by virtue of an agreement on the avoidance of the other Contracting Party.

\(^{574}\) *Id.*

most favourable treatment accorded to investments of investors of any third country, whichever is more favourable”. For example, the concept of ‘like circumstances’ is nowhere mentioned in the relevant non-discrimination provision. However, in a later agreement entered into with Mexico, an attempt has been made to circumscribe the rights of the foreign investor under the MFN and National Treatment clause by inserting the ‘like circumstances’ requirement.

**e. National Treatment**

The National Treatment obligation constitutes one of the core obligations under international trade and investment law. The national treatment obligation measures the state’s treatment of foreign investors against the treatment of similarly situated domestic investors. A large majority of India’s BITs do not provide national treatment at the pre-establishment stage. Interestingly, barring a few BITs such as the India-Mexico BIT, the national treatment provisions do not contain the ‘like circumstances’ clause. Absence of this term allows foreign investments, which are not in like circumstances, to claim a breach of the national treatment obligation. This expands the scope of national treatment protection and reduces the regulatory space available to India to regulate foreign investment. However, India’s recent CEPAs with Japan, Korea, Singapore and Malaysia provide sector specific exceptions to the principle of national treatment. Foreign direct investment in multi-brand retail has been a controversial issue in India. Accordingly, the India-Korea CEPA has specifically excluded the retail trading sector from the application of

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576 *Id.*
580 *Id.*
581 *Id.*
582 *Id.*
583 *Id.*
national treatment. This gives to India the regulatory space to enact laws that favour domestic retailers over foreign (Korea) retailers. However, such sector specific exemptions do not exist in the other 69 Indian BITs, which reduces the regulatory space for India. However, where the national treatment obligation is specifically provided, it is important to provide a tailored definition of the concept of ‘like circumstances’.

f. Limiting Full Protection and Security

The obligation to provide foreign investors Full Protection and Security (FPS) requires the host State to exercise due diligence in protecting foreign investments from adverse acts of private parties (for example, violence by private parties) and of instrumentalities of the state. A major proportion of India’s BIPAs contain FPS provisions, although the meaning and scope of this concept remain unclear. However, India’s recent agreements with Korea, Malaysia and Japan have provided more certainty to this concept. These treaties link FPS to the protection granted under customary international law. Rather than treating FPS as a stand-alone requirement, it is a significant improvement to link this concept with the physical security and protection available for aliens under customary international law.

g. Crafting Public Policy Exceptions

Public international law recognizes the right of states to exercise police powers, including the enactment and enforcement of regulatory functions. The ability to carve out general exceptions to treaty obligations is considered to be a valuable right. All 73 of India’s currently existing BIPAs/BITs contain some general exceptions clause or a non-precluded measure provision. Broadly, the general exceptions allow the respondent state to temporarily deviate from its BIT obligations in situations that warrant giving precedence to various public policy objectives over investment protection. In the case of India’s BIPAs it has,

584 India-Korea CEPA (2005).
585 Chester Brown, Commentaries on Selected Model Investment Treaties, 362 (2013).
however, been noticed that a majority of treaties provide only a narrow category of general exceptions. Those exceptions allow deviations from the treaty only in situations of essential security interest or in circumstances of extreme emergency. Stated differently, deviation from treaty obligations is allowed only in extremely compelling circumstances. It is also noticed that very few Indian BITs allow deviations from investment protection on significant grounds such as public order, health and the environment or on such grounds as boosting domestic industries in economically backward regions. There are, however, notable exceptions as well. For example, the India-Singapore CEPA has general exceptions in the nature of GATT Article XX or GATS Article XIV.587 The India-Malaysia CECA has included national security exception related to the infrastructure sector, which was quite innovative.588

An important, but less considered, area where India might need a public policy exception is national food security. Although FDI is not permitted in the agriculture sector in India, foreign investment in agro-processing industries is available. Feeding more than a billion people is likely to be an increasing challenge for India and one can expect significant foreign direct investment in food and agro-related industries in the foreseeable future. Although the linkages between FDI and food security are not fully explored or understood, there are certain suggestions in the field of international investment law that future BITs should consider, including a public interest clause which could address food security issues, especially in the context of food deficit countries.589

587 Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, India- Singapore, done in New Delhi, June 29, 2005 [Hereinafter, “India- Singapore CEPA (2005)].
588 Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement India- Malaysia, done at Kuala Lumpur, July 1, 2011 [Hereinafter, “India- Malaysia CECA (2011) (exempting actions taken for the protection of critical public infrastructure, including communications, power and water infrastructure from deliberate attempts intended to disable or degrade such infrastructure)
h. Preamble of Investment Treaties

Preambles often serve as an important guide to the interpretation of treaty provisions, including their underlying purpose. As clarified by Article 31 (2) of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (VCLT), the Preamble could inform the rest of the treaty and would be a valuable ‘context’ in treaty interpretation. Indeed, references to non-investment policy objectives should be formulated carefully as these provisions can provide a significant amount of flexibility for a developing country such as India to pursue its development goals in conjunction with providing investor protection. For example, the preamble of the India-Singapore Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement includes the following recitals, “[r]eaffirming their right to pursue economic philosophies suited to their development goals and their right to regulate activities to realize their national policy objectives”. The India-Korea CEPA has also used a similar language in the preamble. It is worth noting that India-Singapore CECA and India-Korea CEPA are very detailed economic cooperation agreements and not essentially investment promotion and protection agreements.

V. Conclusion

As an established player in the international trading system, India had striven to preserve policy autonomy in areas such as TRIPS, Agreement on Agriculture Rules, exclusion of Singapore issues from the Doha Agenda and several other areas. However, the adoption of a western-type investment protection model for a bulk of India’s BITs/BIPAs implies that a broad spectrum of policy or regulatory measures that the government has taken, or may take, could be brought up in international investment arbitrations. This paper has examined various substantive provisions of India’s investment agreements and recommends the areas where India should seek policy autonomy or development space. The paper has examined the key elements of policy flexibility such as a tighter definition of investment, streamlining the meaning of FET standards, limiting the scope of indirect expropriation, exclusion of MFN

590 Preamble, India- Singapore CECA (2005).
and national treatment clauses and selection of appropriate public policy exceptions. The paper suggests the rejection of open-ended and undefined terms which could be susceptible to expansive interpretation. Although, it may not be practically feasible and desirable to terminate or review India’s BIPA at this stage, this paper recommends caution at least with respect to India's future trade and investment treaty negotiations and any review proposals.
## ANNEXURE I

### ITA NOTICE OF DISPUTE (INDIA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Investor</th>
<th>Facts</th>
<th>BIT/Year of the claim or award</th>
<th>Claim ($)</th>
<th>Sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CREDIT LYONNAIS SA, (NOW CALYON SA)</td>
<td>Related to financing of Dabhol Plant. The case was settled under undisclosed terms.</td>
<td>India-France BIT, 2004</td>
<td>Not Disclosed (ND)</td>
<td>Dabhol Power Plant [Energy]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFFSHORE POWER PRODUCTION C.V., TRAVAMARK TWO B.V., EFS INDIA-ENERGY B.V., ENRON B.V., AND INDIAN POWER INVESTMENTS B.V. (NETHERLANDS)</td>
<td>Dabhol Power plant investment</td>
<td>India-Netherlands BIT 2004</td>
<td>An amount of compensation sought over $ 4 billion. The dispute was settled as part of a successful restructurin</td>
<td>Energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPITAL INDIA POWER MAURITIUS I</td>
<td>The investor made a claim under the UNCITRAL rules against the GOI against</td>
<td>Clause under the</td>
<td>Awarded US $94,700,000</td>
<td>Energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AND ENERGY ENTERPRISES (MAURITIUS) COMPANY</td>
<td>the investments made for the development of Dabhol Power Plant. The ICC International Court of Arbitration awarded US$94,700,000 with the simple interest thereon at the rate of 9% per annum from 2 May 2002 to the date of this award for the breaches by Maharashtra Development Cooperation for the breaches of Shareholder Agreement.</td>
<td>Shareholder Agreement - 2005</td>
<td>with simple interest thereon at the rate of 9% per annum.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERSTE BANK DER OESTERREICHISCHE N SPARKSSEN AG</td>
<td>Investments in Dabhol Power Plant. Contents not disclosed.</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>ND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNP PARIBAS</td>
<td>Investments in Dabhol Power Plant. Contents not disclosed.</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>ND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CREDIT LYONNAIS SA, (NOW CALYON SA)</td>
<td>Related to financing of Dabhol Plant. The case was settled under undisclosed terms.</td>
<td>India-France BIT 2004</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>ND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFFSHORE POWER PRODUCTION C.V., B.V., EFS INDIA-ENERGY B.V., ENRON B.V., AND INDIAN POWER INVESTMENTS B.V. (NETHERLANDS)</td>
<td>Power plant investment with an amount of compensation sought over $4 billion. The dispute was settlement as part of a successful restructuring.</td>
<td>India-Netherlands BIT 2004</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>ND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Investment related to financing of Dabhol</td>
<td>India-</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>Energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ABN AMRO N.V</strong></td>
<td>Power Plant. The case was settled on undisclosed terms.</td>
<td>Netherland s BIT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CREDIT SUISSE FIRST BOSTON</strong></td>
<td>The investment was related to the financing of Dabhol Power Plant. The case was settled on an undisclosed terms.</td>
<td>India-Switzerland BIT 2004</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>Energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ANZEF LTD.</strong></td>
<td>Investment related to financing of Dabhol Power Plant. The case was settled on undisclosed terms.</td>
<td>India-UK BIT 2004</td>
<td>Investment related to financing of Dabhol Power Plant.</td>
<td>ND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>STANDARD CHARTERED BANK</strong></td>
<td>Investment related to financing of Dabhol Power Plant and was settled on undisclosed terms</td>
<td>India-UK BIT 2004</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>Energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WHITE INDUSTRIES AUSTRALIA LIMITED</strong></td>
<td>Contractual dispute with Coal India escalated into an ITA with the Indian Government over the inordinate delay in executing the claims by White Industries in the SC. ITA issued--- Dispute won by White Industries on the counts of MFN obligation that India took under its BIT with Australia. A tribunal can find a violation of the ‘effective means’ standard even when the concerned BIT does not contain such a provision as long as it contains a broad</td>
<td>India-Australia BIT 2010</td>
<td>$10 million with interest [decided]</td>
<td>Judicial propriety and consequence of undue delay.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**MFN provision**, which some tribunals will use to import investor guarantees from other BITs. Such happened in this dispute.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dispute</th>
<th>Facts</th>
<th>BIT</th>
<th>Claim ($)</th>
<th>Sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BYCELL</td>
<td>Notice of dispute not made public.</td>
<td>India-Cyrus BIT and India-Russia BIT 2012</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>Not made public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC/DEVAS (MAURITIUS) LTD., DEVAS EMPLOYEES MAURITIUS PRIVATE LIMITED AND TELECOM DEVAS MAURITIUS LIMITED</td>
<td>Notice of dispute not made public</td>
<td>India-Mauritius BIT 2012</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>Not made public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KHAITAN HOLDINGS MAURITIUS LIMITED</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>India-Mauritius BIT 2013</td>
<td>ND</td>
<td>ND</td>
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</table>

**ITA NOTICE OF DISPUTE (Cont’d)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dispute</th>
<th>Facts</th>
<th>BIT</th>
<th>Claim ($)</th>
<th>Sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VODAFONE GROUP PLC</td>
<td>Investor notified India under its BIPA with Netherlands apprehending a $2.2 bn tax demand</td>
<td>India-Netherland</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Telecommunications</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### NETHERLANDS

On its buyout of Hutchinson Essar in 2007. Such was a consequence of an amendment in Section 9 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 in the 2012-13 budget retrospectively from the day of the commencement of the Act after an adverse SC decision that – overseas transactions involving Indian assets could not be taxed. Indian tax authorities have issued a demand notice on Vodafone for failing to deduct tax on its $11 billion payment to Hutchinson Telecommunications International for the acquisition of Hutchinson Essar.

### SISTEMA JFSC

In consequence to the SC’s judgment on 2G spectrum case, Sistema, a Russian company, invoked its right under Article 9.1 of the bilateral investment treaty between Russia and India by filing a notice of dispute against India. Sistema has a joint venture with India’s Shyam Group – Sistema Shyam Teleservices, in which the Russian government also has a stake of 17.14%. Among the 122 licences cancelled by the SC, 21 licences belonged to Sistema Shyam TeleServices Ltd, in which Sistema owns a 56.68% share. Sistema stated that the cancellation of SSITL’s licences following Sistema’s investment of billions of dollars into the Indian cellular sector is contrary to India’s obligations under the BIT, including India–Russia BIT.

| SISTEMA JFSC | India–Russia BIT | $3.1 billion worth of investment at stake | Telecommunications |
obligations to provide investments with full protection and security and obligations not the expropriate investments. The company said that it would arbitrate against the cancellation and consequently protect its $3.1 billion investment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THE CHILDREN INVESTMENT FUND (TCI) [UK-BASED HEDGE FUND]</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TCI has a minority stake in Coal India (1% shareholding). It served an arbitration notice questioning the Government of India’s direction to Coal India to delink the price of domestically produced coal from imported prices while concluding fuel supply agreements with independent power producers, a move that would lower the price of coal sold by the firm. TCI contends that Coal India’s profits will decline by $20 billion and the interests of the minority shareholders in the firm will be affected as a result.</td>
<td>$20 billion of profits at stake</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TELENOR (NORWEGIAN COMPANY)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian telecom operator Telenor lost its 22 2G licences after the SC Judgment. It consequently served a notice on the government, threatening international arbitration and claiming damages of nearly $14 billion (Rs. 70,000 crores). Telenor invoked the provisions of India’s CECA with Singapore to issue a notice seeking a solution from the government within six months or drag the matter for an international arbitration from failure to protect its investment. Telenor stated that there</td>
<td>India-Singapore CECA $14 billion damages</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|  |  |
|  | Telecom |
could be future breach of CECA from the manner in which these licences are now distributed through auctions. The notice further stated that the compensation has to be equivalent to the market value of the expropriated investment at the time of the decision which is 2 February 2012; the day when the SC cancelled 122 licences issued during ex-telecom minister . Telenor claims to have invested close to $14 billion in its Indian operations. However, the company has recently declared to have dropped its decision to seek arbitration given the set-off of Rs. 1,658 crore on payments to be made for the new spectrum it won after the quashing of its previous licences. Such a set-off is for the payment made by its previous JV partner, Unitech Wireless, towards its 22 licences that were quashed by the SC.

| AXIATA (MALAYSIA) | Malaysian telecom major, Axiata has notified an investor arbitration notice to India. Axiata owns 19.69% in Idea Cellular, claims that its investments in India faces risk because of the SC decision. | India-Mauritius BIPA | - | Telecom |
| CAPITAL GLOBAL AND KAIF INVESTMENT (MAURITIUS) | In October 2013, Khaitan Holdings Mauritius (KHML), a Mauritius-registered company owing 26% equity in Loop Telecom initiated an international arbitration notice against Indian Government seeking a compensation of US $ 1.4 billion | India-Mauritius BIT | US$ 1.4 billion | Telecom |
billion over the cancellation of its 21 telecom licences by the SC. The SC while cancelling 12 licences of 22 telecom operators held that the allotment of spectrum was unconstitutional and arbitrary and directed the government to conduct fresh auctions for sale of the spectrum within a span of 4 months. The claim by the company consist of $140 million investment in Loop Telecom in 200 with 12 percent interest till the claim is received, loss of $1 billion in shareholder revenue and loss of $300 million in the market value of 21 licences.
**ANNEXURE-II**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sl. No.</th>
<th>Name of the Agreement and the participating countries</th>
<th>Date of Signing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Till 1995</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>India - Bhutan Agreement on Trade, Commerce and Transit</td>
<td>17.01.1972 (revised on 28.7.2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Global System of Trade Preferences (GSTP)</td>
<td>April, 1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1995-2000</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Agreement on South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA)</td>
<td>04.01.2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2003 onwards</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>India – MERCOSUR</td>
<td>25.01.2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>India - Thailand FTA - Early Harvest Scheme (EHS)</td>
<td>01.09.2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>India - Singapore Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA); Second Review of the Singapore CECA</td>
<td>29.06.2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>India – Afghanistan</td>
<td>06.03.2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>India – MERCOSUR</td>
<td>25.01.2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>India – Chile; Expansion of Indo-Chile Preferential Trade Agreement</td>
<td>08.03.2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement</td>
<td>Status</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. India- Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSEC)</td>
<td>Negotiations ongoing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. India-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Free Trade Agreement (FTA)</td>
<td>Negotiations ongoing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. India-South African Customs Union (SACU) Free Trade Agreement</td>
<td>Negotiations ongoing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. India-Pakistan Trading Agreement</td>
<td>Negotiations ongoing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. India – New Zealand CECA</td>
<td>Negotiations ongoing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. India – Canada CEPA</td>
<td>Negotiations ongoing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. India – Australia CECA</td>
<td>Negotiations ongoing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. India – Indonesia CECA</td>
<td>Negotiations ongoing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. India – Israel Free Trade Agreement</td>
<td>Negotiations ongoing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. India – EU Broad Based Trade and Investment Agreement</td>
<td>Negotiations ongoing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. India– EFTA Broad Based Trade and Investment Agreement</td>
<td>Negotiations ongoing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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